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Summary
In 1968, an Ad Hoc committee at the Harvard Medical
School advanced new criteria for determining death. It pro-
posed that patients in irreversible coma with no discernible
central nervous system activity were actually dead. The
committee paved the way for the “whole brain” definition
of death, which has reached broad public acceptance and
legal enactment in many countries. Despite this, the philo-
sophical and ethical debate about the “whole brain” defini-
tion of death is far from being closed. This paper analyses
the ongoing controversy and evaluates the recent revision
of the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences guidelines for
determining death.
Key words: medical ethics; determination of death; end-
of-life; organ transplantation
Introduction
Death has been a constant companion of medical practice.
Yet the need to define it has become a distinctive trait only
of contemporary medicine. In the past, there was little con-
troversy that a patient was dead when his or her heart and
lungs had irreversibly ceased to function. Respiratory and
circulatory arrest were closely linked to a loss of function
of other vital organs, and clinicians had only limited means
to maintain the function of some vital organs when oth-
ers had failed. In particular, respiratory and circulatory ar-
rest quickly resulted in irreversible brain damage, whereas
severe brain damage quickly led to respiratory and circu-
latory arrest. This changed dramatically in the late 1950s
when the use of mechanical ventilation and intensive care
became widespread. Clinicians were now able to sustain
cardiopulmonary function in patients with severe brain
damage, who would die from cardiac arrest as soon as
ventilatory support was withdrawn. Death was no longer a
seemingly singular event after cardiopulmonary arrest, but
Abbreviations
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DCD Donation after cardiac death
PVS Persistent vegetative state
SAMS Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences
appeared to be dissociated into the failure of single vital or-
gan systems.
Soon the question arose whether ventilated patients with
seemingly no brain activity should be considered as being
in the process of dying or being dead [1, 2]. Do clinicians
have an obligation to treat these patients? Or are they per-
mitted to withhold or withdraw life support? These ques-
tions became increasingly urgent as the number of vent-
ilated patients soared, yet the critical care infrastructure
remained both limited and costly. Surely the duty to treat
did not apply to dead patients. The need to distinguish
between dead and dying patients gained further urgency
in the 1960s as the field of organ transplantation evolved
rapidly. Under which conditions are clinicians permitted
to remove vital organs from a patient, such as the heart,
while ensuring the viability of these organs for transplant-
ation? Traditional medical ethics requires clinicians not to
kill their patients, but the removal of viable vital organs ap-
peared to violate this obligation.
In 1968, an Ad Hoc Committee at the Harvard Medical
School sought to settle these questions by defining irrevers-
ible coma – determined as “no discernible central nervous
system activity” – as a new criterion for death [3]. The
Harvard committee paved the way for the “whole brain”
definition of death, which has become the legal definition
of death in Switzerland and in many other countries. Yet
despite the broad consensus among policy makers, defining
death based on neurological criteria remains controversial.
Is “whole brain” death the death of a human being or just
the death of the human brain? Is the brain actually dead
when the irreversible loss of brain function has been dia-
gnosed following standard criteria? And to what extent
are “whole brain” death criteria motivated by the practical
need to retrieve viable vital organs for transplantation?
The present paper analyses the key lines of argument about
definitions of death in the context of transplantation medi-
cine. The arguments are traced in the debate about “whole
brain” death in Switzerland, focusing in particular on the
2011 revision of the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences
(SAMS) guidelines for determining death [4]. Switzerland
has an interesting history of allowing donation after cardiac
arrest based on criteria of “whole brain” death. However,
the recent guidelines raise concerns both about the irrevers-
ibility of “whole brain” death after 10 minutes of cardi-
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ac arrest and the certainty of a one-time clinical diagnosis
in this situation. In many ways the Swiss debate can be
seen as a burning glass for the problems that beleaguer the
“whole brain” standard of death. The paper closes by dis-
cussing the main policy options for the future.
Death and the duties of doctors
Although a biological event, the death of a human being
has profound moral implications [5, 6]. Death fundament-
ally changes what we owe to each other in moral terms. Ob-
ligations towards the living cease to exist, while new oblig-
ations towards the dead emerge. For example, the promise
to be faithful to one’s husband no longer remains after his
death. A widow also accrues the right to use, sell or even
destroy her husband’s property after he has died – a right
that she would not have had during his lifetime without his
consent. At the same time, a widow acquires new obliga-
tions towards her deceased husband, such as the obligation
to respect his wishes regarding burial.
Death is of particular moral importance in the clinical en-
counter. Clinicians use powerful interventions to save the
life and improve or restore the health of their patients.
However, if used inappropriately, these interventions can
do patients more harm than good and sometimes even kill
them. Clinicians therefore have fundamental moral obliga-
tions in relation to death. According to traditional medical
ethics, clinicians’ primary duty is not to intentionally kill
their patients. As a rule, clinicians ought to avoid pre-
ventable death by treating patients in need. They should,
however, allow their patients’ death when they can no
longer achieve the goals of treatment – in light of the pref-
erences and values of the patient – and pain or other dis-
tressing symptoms prevail. Clinicians are also charged with
declaring death consistent with the existing legal provi-
sions. Traditionally clinicians determine death based on the
cardiopulmonary standard, which defines death as the irre-
versible cessation of cardiopulmonary function.
The rise of transplantation medicine posed a challenge to
these fundamental moral obligations of clinicians. Trans-
plantation requires a source of viable organs, and human
beings are the main source as the use of organs from an-
imals or artificial organs is still limited. But the reliance
on human donors poses a fundamental problem for the re-
trieval of viable vital organs, in particular the heart. If tra-
ditional medical ethics requires clinicians not to kill their
patients, how can they harvest vital organs that are viable
enough to be transplanted? Foregoing organ retrieval, and
hence foregoing the transplantation of vital organs, does
not seem to be a reasonable option. After all, clinicians also
have a duty to avoid preventable death in patients with or-
gan failure. A convenient way of solving this dilemma is to
restrict organ retrieval to those patients who are dead, but
nonetheless have viable organs. Patients who have no dis-
cernible central nervous activity, but whose cardiopulmon-
ary function is maintained through mechanical ventilation
and intensive care, seem to fulfill these criteria. These pa-
tients are determined to be dead in accordance with neuro-
logical criteria: they are dead on the “whole brain” standard
of death.
The concept of “whole brain” death allows clinicians to re-
concile the retrieval of viable vital organs with their tradi-
tional moral obligations regarding death, notably the duty
not to kill their patients [7]. That is, a clinician does not
kill a “brain dead” patient by removing his or her heart and/
or other vital organs for the purposes of transplantation be-
cause the patient is already dead. Indeed, most laws and
regulations allow vital organs to be harvested for trans-
plantation only after the donor has been declared dead on
established legal standards. This is often referred to as the
“dead donor rule”. Yet making death a necessary condition
for the retrieval of vital organs presses the question of when
a patient is in fact dead.
(Re-)defining death
The pressure to retrieve organs for transplantation, along
with the developing ability to sustain cardiopulmonary
function in patients with severe brain damage, led to a fun-
damental re-thinking of death in modern medicine. The tra-
ditional “cardiopulmonary” standard still served its pur-
pose of determining death outside the context of transplant-
ation medicine (and continues to do so to this day). Yet it
greatly limited the retrieval of viable vital organs for trans-
plantation and seemingly demanded the continued treat-
ment of patients with no discernible brain activity. This
situation led to two approaches of reconceptualising death:
“whole brain” and “higher brain” death. The “whole brain”
standard of death is now implemented in many national le-
gislations, including in Switzerland [8, 9]. However, due to
the continuing shortage of transplantable organs, a new in-
terpretation of the traditional “cardiopulmonary” standard
of death has been introduced and widely implemented over
the past two decades. The following sections analyses each
of these standards of death and the key problems that they
raise (see table 1 for an overview).
“Whole brain” death
The “whole brain” standard of death defines death as the ir-
reversible loss of function of the higher brain and the brain-
stem. Above all this includes the irreversible loss of con-
sciousness and the patient’s permanent inability to breathe
spontaneously. According to the standard’s most influential
justification, the brain is the central integrator of the human
body, necessary for coordinating the various bodily sys-
tems and allowing the body to function as an “integrated
whole”. Death is assumed to occur when the body stops
functioning as an integrated whole. Death therefore occurs
when the whole brain – that is, the higher brain and the
brainstem – has ceased to function as the central integrator
[2]. Given the functions inherent in these anatomical areas,
the “whole brain” standard of death claims to represent an
organismic view of the human being. It connects three ba-
sic dimensions of human life – the biological, the cognitive
and the sentient [5].
The “whole brain” standard of death might seem plausible
at first glance, because it reflects these basic dimensions
of human life. Yet the growing clinical experience with
“brain dead” patients reveals that these patients are still
alive based on this standard. Robust evidence shows that
the integrative functioning of the organism as a whole does
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not depend exclusively on the brain. With the aid of mech-
anical ventilation and nursing care, patients who are cor-
rectly diagnosed as “brain dead” digest food, regulate salt
and water homeostasis, maintain their temperature, grow
hair, heal wounds, fight infections, react to stress, grow
in length, go through puberty, and even gestate fetuses
[10–12]. For sure, it is questionable that these functions –
often termed as “residual” – really constitute human life.
Yet “brain dead” patients clearly perform a variety of in-
tegrating functions of the organism as a whole, sometimes
for years. Thus, it is not only counterintuitive that patients
should be considered dead when they perform all these
functions [13, 14]. “Brain dead” patients also fail the cent-
ral requirement set out by the “whole brain” standard of
death, namely that the body ceases to function as an integ-
rated whole. The brain, it turns out, simply is not the cent-
ral integrator of bodily functioning [11].
Importantly, other versions for the “whole brain” standard
of death run into similar problems. For example, the U.S.
President’s Council recently argued that death occurs when
a patient no longer carries out the “fundamental vital work
of a living organism”, which includes being receptive to
stimuli and signals from the surrounding environment [12].
However, many of the above listed functions in “brain
dead” patients reflect receptivity to such stimuli, such as
the ability to heal wounds and fight infections.
“Higher brain” death
The “higher brain” standard of death defines death as the
irreversible loss of function of the higher brain, which in-
volves the permanent incapacity to return to consciousness
(as opposed to a temporary incapacity to return to con-
sciousness, for example during sleep). No jurisdiction has
adopted the “higher brain” standard, but several scholars
have defended it as the best way of reconceptualising death
in modern medicine [15]. While these scholars have de-
veloped different versions of the “higher brain” standard
of death, a common element in all of them is the irrevers-
Table 1: Standards of death in the context of transplantation medicine.
Standard Definition Justification Clinical tests in adults
(Switzerland)*
Key objections
“Cardiopulmonary”
death
Irreversible
cessation of
cardiopulmonary
function.
• Death of the organism: human life is
essentially biological.
• Cardiopulmonary function is necessary for
a living organism.
Does not apply in Switzerland, but in othercountries (e.g., United States)Δ. • Traditional interpretation: limits theretrieval of viable vital organs (e.g., heart).
• Updated interpretation (“donation after
cardiac death” protocols): the cessation of
cardiopulmonary function is not
irreversible after 5–10 min, but vital
organs need to be removed during this
time period in order to be viable.
1. Death due to primary brain damage
• Clinical examination, conducted jointly
by two physicians (one clinician not
directly involved in caring for the patient)#.
• Appropriate additional test to
demonstrate the absence of cerebral
circulation only if
a. the cessation of brain function is not
adequately explained by the
structural damage detected by
imaging [or]
b. potentially reversible factors cannot
be excluded as contributory
elements [or]
c. cranial nerve function cannot be
clinically assessed.
“Whole brain”
death
Irreversible
cessation of
functioning of
the entire brain,
including the
brainstem.
• Death of the organism as an integrated
unit: human life is essentially biological,
sentient, and cognitive.
• The brain (including brainstem) is the
central integrator of overall bodily
functioning: when the entire brain
irreversibly ceases to function, the human
organism no longer functions as an
integrated whole.
2. Death after permanent cardiac arrest
• Diagnosis of cardiay arrest via
transthoracic echocardiography;
• 10 min waiting time without
cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
• Clinical examination (see above).
• The organism of patients who are
correctly diagnosed as “whole brain dead”
continues to function as an integrated
whole: patients digest food, regulate salt
and water homeostasis, maintain their
temperature, grow hair, heal wounds, fight
infections, react to stress, grow in length,
go through puberty, and even gestate
fetuses.
• It is not clear that the cessation of
functioning of the entire brain is
irreversible after 10 min of circulatory
arrest.
“Higher brain”
death
Irreversible
cessation of
functioning of
the higher brain
(no capacity for
consciousness).
• Death of the person: human life is
essentially sentient and cognitive.
• Higher brain function is necessary for the
capacity for consciousness, which is
necessary for certain conceptions of
personhood: when the higher brain
irreversibly ceases to function, the
individual person ceases to exist.
Does not apply in Switzerland nor in othercountries. • The standard has highly counterintuitiveconsequences: if self-awareness is seen
as necessary for personhood, patients in
irreversible coma or a persistent
vegetative state would have to be
considered dead; if the ability to reason or
act morally is seen as necessary, severely
demented patients would have to be
considered dead.
* Tests for diagnosing “whole brain” death are based on the 2011 Guidelines for Determining Death issued by the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences [4]. There is an
additional chapter on determining death in children, which is not reflected in this table. According to the 2007 Swiss law on transplantation, death occurs after the
irreversible loss of brain function (including the brain stem) [28].
# The clinical examination must demonstrate all of the following clinical signs: (1.) coma; (2.) bilaterally dilated pupils, unresponsive to light; (3.) absent oculoephalic and
vestibulo-ocular reflexes; (4.) absent corneal reflexes; (5.) no cerebral response to painful stimuli; (6.) absent cough and gag reflexes; (7.) no sponteaneous respiration
(apnea test).Δ The “cardiopulmonary” standard is used to diagnose death outside the context of transplantation medicine.
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ible loss of some ability for which the capacity for con-
sciousness is necessary – for example, having self-aware-
ness over time or being able to reason and act morally [5].
Proponents of the “higher brain” standard of death com-
monly argue that the essence of human life lies in being a
person with some basic awareness or understanding of the
self. On this view, death occurs when personhood is per-
manently lost.
It is not surprising that the “higher brain” standard of death
has not been adopted by any legislature. There is no philo-
sophical consensus on what constitutes personhood.
Moreover, depending on what notion of personhood is as-
sumed, the “higher brain” standard has highly counterintu-
itive consequences that would likely undermine public trust
and support of organ donation. If self-awareness is seen as
necessary for personhood, patients in irreversible coma or
a persistent vegetative state would have to be considered
dead despite their spontaneous cardiopulmonary activity. If
the ability to reason or act morally is seen as necessary,
severely demented patients would have to be considered
dead – although they are capable not only of spontaneous
breathing, but also of some forms of social life. The “high-
er brain” standard of death therefore has been discussed
primarily among academics. Furthermore, even academics
have raised concerns about this standard for its tendency to
reduce human life to personhood and devalue the dimen-
sion of embodiment [14].
The resurgence of “cardiopulmonary” death
According to the traditional “cardiopulmonary” standard,
death occurs after the irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory function. Widely adopted to diagnose death
outside the context of transplantation medicine, the “car-
diopulmonary” standard significantly limits the retrieval
of viable vital organs for transplantation, in particular the
heart. This situation changed in the early 1990s, however,
when transplant centres began implementing protocols for
an expedited “donation after cardiac death” (DCD) [16].
DCD protocols allow clinicians to harvest viable vital or-
gans as soon as cardiopulmonary arrest is deemed to be ir-
reversible, typically several minutes after diagnosing a loss
of circulatory and respiratory function.
DCD protocols might be seen as a welcome return to the
traditional “cardiopulmonary” standard of death. However,
the available evidence about cardiopulmonary resuscitation
suggests that some patients who undergo DCD are still
alive based on this standard. In an effort to harvest vital or-
gans that are viable for transplantation, some protocols al-
low organ retrieval as early as 75 seconds after diagnos-
ing cardiac arrest [17]. Yet common clinical experience
and clinical trials on cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
show that some patients are successfully resuscitated after
5 or more minutes of asystole [18–21]. This suggests that
cardiopulmonary function has not ceased irreversibly when
vital organs are extracted after a waiting time of 5 minutes
or less after cardiac arrest. The only way to make sense
of such short waiting times is to assume that cardiac arrest
is irreversible, provided that no efforts of resuscitation are
made. Indeed, scant evidence supports this interpretation
of irreversibility as there are no documented cases of car-
diac autoresuscitation after 75 seconds of asystole when
CPR is not attempted [22]. But as some commentators have
pointed out, this interpretation of irreversibility is not lo-
gical. Irreversibility normally means that something is im-
possible to undo – not that something would be possible
to undo but for the fact that one chooses not to undo it
[23]. That is, the determination of irreversible cardiac ar-
rest does not depend on the clinical decision to forgo CPR,
but it reflects a physiological condition of irreversibility
[24]. To exclude the possibility of successful resuscitation
and hence to ensure that cardiac arrest is irreversible, clini-
cians would have to wait more than 5 minutes after cardi-
ac arrest before removing organs. Yet this approach would
jeopardise the viability of organs in patients eligible for
DCD.
The situation in Switzerland
Swiss guidelines for determining death: a brief history
The Swiss debate about standards of death began in 1969,
when the first successful heart transplant in Switzerland
raised public concern that the donor could not have been
dead if his heart continued to function in the recipient
[25–26]. Under considerable public pressure, the SAMS is-
sued its first “Guidelines for the Definition and Diagnosis
of Death” later that year [27]. These guidelines endorsed
a dual standard of death as “(1.) irreversible cardiac arrest
and – as a result of the latter – interrupted blood circulation
of the organism, and thereby also of the brain: cardio-circu-
latory death, or (2.) total, irreversible cessation of cerebral
function or death of the brain: cerebral death” [translation
by authors].
The SAMS guidelines were unique insofar as they closely
linked the “cardiopulmonary” standard of death in the con-
text of organ transplantation to the irreversible loss of brain
function. Subsequent revisions of the guidelines main-
tained and further developed this approach. For example,
the guidelines' most recent version states that death can
either occur through the “irreversible cessation of the func-
tions of the brain, including the brainstem, as a result of
primary brain damage or disorder; [or through] permanent
cardiac arrest, which reduces or abolishes the cerebral cir-
culation, until the irreversible cessation of the functions of
the brain and brainstem - and thus death - ensues (death
after cardiac arrest)” [4]. The 2007 Swiss Law on Trans-
plantation equally defines death as the irreversible cessa-
tion of brain and brainstem function and, unlike compar-
able legislations, does not include a disjunctive “cardiopul-
monary” definition of death [28]. This shows that “whole
brain” death is the fundamental concept of death in Swiss
guidelines and regulations in the context of transplantation
medicine.
Consistent with this finding, DCD practices in Switzerland
have been – and continue to be – justified on the “whole
brain” standard of death. DCD protocols were first intro-
duced in the U.S. in the early 1990s and adopted shortly
thereafter in Switzerland [29]. Reflecting this change of
practice, the 1996 version of the SAMS guidelines was
the first to make the determination of “cardiac” death a
separate topic from brain death [30]. DCD was allowed
after 30 minutes of unsuccessful CPR in a hospital setting,
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provided that two qualified clinicians had clinically dia-
gnosed “whole brain” death (i.e. deep coma, no cranial
nerve reflexes, etc.). In line with contemporary guidance
from the American Academy of Neurology [31], the 1996
guidelines also introduced the requirement of a second
clinical examination in ventilated “brain dead” patients
after a minimal observation period of 6 hours (or longer
in children). No explanation was given as to why a second
clinical examination was deemed necessary to confirm
“whole brain” death in ventilated patients, but not in pa-
tients in cardiac arrest after CPR had failed.
The 2005 version of the guidelines continued to endorse
differential requirements for clinically diagnosing brain
death in ventilated patients and patients in cardiac arrest
[32]. It also broadened the scope of patients eligible for
DCD, stipulating that vital organs can be removed from pa-
tients after 10 minutes of observed and uninterrupted car-
diac and circulatory arrest, either following no CPR or un-
successful CPR for 20 minutes. The most recent revision of
the SAMS guidelines from 2011 essentially maintains these
requirements regarding DCD, although cardiac arrest must
now be documented by a transthoracic echocardiogram [4].
Importantly, the guidelines no longer require that ventilated
“brain dead” patients be clinically examined for a second
time after a minimum waiting period of 6 hours. Consistent
with current opinion and recommendations from the Amer-
ican Academy of Neurology [33–34], the clinical examin-
ation has to be performed only once – albeit by two quali-
fied physicians – provided that the loss of brain function is
adequately explained.
The “whole brain” death approach to donation after
cardiac death
The “whole brain” death approach to DCD seemingly
avoids the problem of irreversibility that arises when DCD
is based on the “cardiopulmonary” standard of death. Be-
cause the irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary func-
tion is not a requirement, it is irrelevant whether or not
the loss of cardiac function is reversible. Yet the analogous
question arises regarding the irreversible loss of brain func-
tion, including the brainstem, after 10 minutes of cardiac
arrest. Not only are some patients successfully resuscitated
after 5 or more minutes of asystole, but some of them also
recover with normal or almost normal neurological func-
tion. Resuscitation research shows that 10–15% of patients
recover with normal or only moderately disabled cerebral
function when they are successfully resuscitated after more
than 5–6 minutes (and up to 35 minutes) of cardiac arrest
[19–21]. This suggests that the loss of brain function is not
irreversible after 10 minutes of cardiac arrest. Data from
animal research further support this claim, as good neuro-
logical outcomes after delayed CPR have been documented
in dogs, cats and monkeys [35, 36].
Furthermore, in the context of DCD, it is not possible
to confirm the clinical diagnosis of “whole brain” death
without compromising the viability of vital organs for
transplantation. For sure, the SAMS guidelines mandate
that two physicians diagnose “whole brain” death [4]. But
a one-time clinical exam may not be sufficient to establish
the irreversible loss of brain and brainstem function with
reasonable certainty. In its 2010 guideline update on de-
termining “whole brain” death in ventilated patients, the
American Academy of Neurology states that “there is in-
sufficient evidence to determine the minimally acceptable
observation period to ensure that neurologic functions have
ceased irreversibly” [33]. The Academy goes on to offer
“opinion-based” guidance, stating that one neurologic ex-
amination is adequate for pronouncing brain death.
However, this recommendation is explicitly based on the
assumption that “a certain period of time has passed since
the onset of the brain insult to exclude the possibility of re-
covery (in practice, usually several hours)” [33]. Obviously
this is not the case in the context of DCD. For the same
reason, data on the benefits of repeat examination in vent-
ilated “brain dead” patients may be difficult to extrapolate
to patients in cardiac arrest [37]. Hence both the irrevers-
ibility of “whole brain” death after 10 minutes of cardiac
and circulatory arrest and the certainty of a one-time clinic-
al diagnosis in this situation are questionable. Furthermore,
even if “whole brain” death was irreversible and properly
diagnosed by a one-time clinical exam, the concerns about
“whole brain” death described above would still pertain.
Policy implications
Each of the existing standards of death gives reason for
serious concern. At the same time, organ transplantation
saves and improves the lives of many patients and would
be much too costly, in moral terms, to give up. Alternative
sources of organs from animals or the laboratory bench
will at best be available in the distant future. How, then,
should we proceed in this situation? The following para-
graphs briefly discuss the key policy options that societies
may embrace today.
Abandoning the “dead donor rule”
One proposal is to abandon the requirement that patients
must be dead to retrieve their vital organs in a viable con-
dition. Instead, the ethical acceptability of harvesting vi-
able vital organs would depend on two conditions: the valid
consent of the donor and an acceptable risk-benefit ratio
for both the individual patient and society [7, 38]. That is,
organs could only be removed if the patient or his or her
surrogate has consented to the removal and the patient’s
clinical prognosis is bleak. This approach effectively separ-
ates questions surrounding the determination of death from
questions about the ethical permissibility of retrieving vi-
able vital organs for transplantation. Death would no longer
be a requirement for organ removal.
The approach has several benefits. Organ transplantation
could continue despite the finding that vital organ donors
are not dead on the existing standards of death. This would
promote honest relationships between patients, clinicians,
and the public. The approach also adheres to the funda-
mental ethical requirements for clinical care, namely con-
sent and a favourable risk-benefit ratio. It is therefore con-
sistent with how treatment decisions are made in medicine
more generally, including in areas of medicine that are
closely related to “post-mortem” organ donation (e.g., live
kidney and liver donation, end-of-life care). However,
abandoning the “dead donor rule” in favour of consent and
risk-benefit considerations would clearly expose organ ex-
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traction as an act of permissible killing. This seems to be
at odds with clinicians’ traditional duty not to intention-
ally kill their patients. While exceptions from this duty
are arguably justifiable, abandoning the “dead donor rule”
would likely expose further inconsistencies of current clin-
ical practice with the traditional norms of medicine and/or
provoke additional revisions of these norms (e.g., regard-
ing end-of-life care) [7]. It is not clear that clinicians and
the public would be friendly to these changes. Abandoning
the “dead donor rule” might thus reduce trust in clinicians
as well as the willingness to donate organs to the public.
Individualising standards of death
Another proposal is to allow individuals to choose their
own standard of death from a preset range of options [39].
This approach would concede that reasonable people might
disagree about the existing standards of death. Consistent
with the tenets of liberal democracies, it would restrict the
power of the state to impose one standard of death on all
citizens and promote individual choice. Although in line
with the goals and values of Western societies, individu-
alised standards of death would be fraught with practic-
al problems. They would result in considerable moral and
legal uncertainty, as individuals in the same clinical state
would be either dead or alive depending on their preferred
standard of death. Furthermore, it is not clear that individu-
als would want to choose “their” standard of death. Even
with highly proactive advance care planning programmes,
only a third of patients complete an advance directive for
their end-of-life care [40]. It seems unlikely that individu-
als would be more willing to think about their death than
their care at the end of life.
Maintaining the status quo
Given the problems of abandoning the “dead donor rule”
or individualising standards of death, another option is to
simply leave things as they are. For sure, the above dis-
cussion suggests that patients eligible for DCD and “brain
dead” patients are neither dead based on the “whole brain”
nor on the “cardiopulmonary” standard of death. Maintain-
ing these standards would therefore require some dishon-
esty on behalf of clinicians and increasingly the public as
well. It is also questionable that death, even if it could be
clearly determined in patients whose vital organs are still
viable for transplantation, is a necessary ethical require-
ment for procuring such organs [7]. However, in the public
policy arena there is an inevitable bias towards the status
quo [41]. Given the substantial uncertainties of fundament-
al reform, in particular regarding the impact on organ dona-
tion rates, it seems likely that the “dead donor rule” and the
concept of “whole brain” death will be upheld in the fore-
seeable future. Although this approach has clear limitations
as discussed in this paper, it may well be the best way to
maintain public trust in clinicians, regulators and legislat-
ors [42].
Conclusion
Although death has been a constant companion of medical
practice, the past decades have seen intense controversy
over what constitutes death and how it should be determ-
ined. The traditional “cardiopulmonary” standard of death
posed a serious problem in the context of transplantation
medicine, as it significantly limited the removal of viable
vital organs for transplantation. The introduction of the
“whole brain” standard of death addressed this problem,
but robust empirical evidence has now emerged that “brain
dead” patients are not dead based on this standard. Fur-
thermore, despite introducing the concept of “whole brain”
death, organs for transplantation became increasingly
scarce. While the development of DCD protocols helped
to ameliorate this situation, questions arose as to whether
DCD is consistent with either the traditional “cardiopul-
monary” or the “whole brain” standard of death. Given the
tremendous benefits of transplantation medicine, as well
as the significant uncertainties associated with reforming
transplantation policy, fundamental changes in the determ-
ination of death are unlikely. However, controversy sur-
rounding the “whole brain” standard of death and DCD
protocols will surely continue – in Switzerland and else-
where.
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